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1. Overview 
As policy-makers turn their attention to Africa’s youth employment challenge and respond with 
programmes targeting young people, it is paramount to assess the extent to which this challenge 
is about broader contextual factors that affect everyone, versus factors that affect young people 
only or primarily. Despite two decades of relative stability and economic prosperity, 
unemployment, underemployment, informality, and low-quality work remain the norm in much of 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The report focuses on this region,1 where many countries have been 
experiencing jobless growth. Africa is also the youngest continent, and young people here face 
an extremely challenging job situation. This raises two questions: how youth-specific is Africa’s 
youth employment challenge? And how youth-specific are its causes?  
Understanding the pieces of this puzzle is both an empirical and a conceptual task. This report 
critically reviews existing knowledge about the extent to which, and in what ways, young people 
are disproportionately disadvantaged in African labour markets, and interrogates how much this 
has to do with their being young people. It assesses the extent to which five sets of factors, 
which are commonly discussed in the literature on African employment outcomes, are youth-
specific:  
 insufficient education and qualifications 
 prohibitive legal and governance frameworks 
 infrastructure constraints 
 socio-cultural norms 
 patronage, politics, and social networks. 
This report is written against a backdrop of growing donor engagement with African youth 
employment, underwritten at least in part by fears of violence stemming from a demographic 
‘youth bulge’ and converse promises of an economic ‘demographic dividend’. Policies have often 
been built on assumptions about essential attributes that young people may have, or particular 
circumstances they may face. For instance, some discussions hold young people to be 
essentially entrepreneurial, innovative, or needing more marketable skills, and deduce from this a 
need to support instrumentalist actions, such as providing skills training and access to finance. 
However, essentialisms are never a basis for good policy. At the same time, discussions that 
reduce the youth employment challenge to a mere sub-challenge or symptom of broader 
structural problems risk papering over what is youth-specific about the African employment 
challenge. If young people face particular problems of exclusion, discrimination, or 
disqualification, even a (theoretical) rising tide of economic growth would not lift all boats equally.  
The following section provides a concise empirical overview of Africa’s youth employment 
challenge, addressing what is known about the extent to which young people are 
disproportionately affected by employment problems. While statistics alone cannot capture the 
complexity and fluidity of African labour markets, a picture nonetheless emerges of many young 
people working less than they would like to, seeking better work, working in insecure and 
precarious jobs, working informally, engaging in ‘survival’ entrepreneurship, and doing work that 
is not considered a ‘proper’ job. But the picture is variegated, with different groups – based on 
                                                   
1 Any references to ‘Africa’ in this paper should be taken to mean sub-Saharan Africa.  
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gender (young women/men), area of residence (rural/urban), and socioeconomic group 
(higher/lower class) – facing very different opportunities and barriers.  
The main body of this report, Section 3, reviews the arguments for and against five factors as 
being more or less youth-specific. The findings for each are complex, context-dependent, and 
based on the limited knowledge to be gained from secondary sources: 
 Insufficient education and qualifications. Although access to education has expanded 
massively in Africa, some education systems still deliver low-quality learning, the wrong 
skills, or unfair expectations. While these may be crucial barriers, they are not clearly 
youth-specific, because today’s younger people are, on the whole, better-educated. 
However, they are also inherently less experienced, which presents an employment 
barrier. 
 Prohibitive legal and governance frameworks. We cannot answer the much larger 
question about the extent to which over-regulation or poor governance represent barriers 
to growth and job-creation. However, the evidence and logic to suggest that African 
young people are disproportionately constrained by ‘business environment’ regulation or 
labour laws are weak. 
 Infrastructure constraints. Poor infrastructure, such as transportation or energy, affects 
younger and older people more or less equally. However, where information and 
communications technology (ICT) infrastructure is lacking, this might affect younger 
people more strongly.  
 Socio-cultural norms. There is often friction in the interplay between young people’s 
aspirations about work and older people’s expectations about the work younger people 
should do, and what work is available. Individual and collective aspirations, attitudes and 
norms can act as strong informal barriers; these are partly class- and gender-specific, but 
also partly youth-specific. 
 Patronage, politics, and social networks. When there are few available jobs and many 
job-seekers, social networks can strongly influence access to work. Young people’s 
social networks and the politics of African job markets have complex and differential 
effects. ‘Who you know’ matters for everyone, but young people may be less well-
positioned.  
Section 4 concludes with some implications which may follow from the findings of this review, 
arguing for greater attention to be paid to informal barriers, against instrumentalising youth in 
addressing particular formal barriers, and for greater consideration for the diversity of young 
people and their contexts in policy and programme responses. 
2. The scale of Africa’s youth employment challenge 
In this section, we engage with the key concepts of ‘youth’ and ‘employment’ and convey the 
scale and nature of the African youth employment challenge as much as the data will allow. This 
is necessary for at least two reasons. Firstly, African countries now have some of the youngest, 
fastest-growing populations. The ten youngest populations in the world – with median ages 
ranging from 14 to 17 – are all in Africa (Myers, 2016). Thus, African employment challenges 
readily lend themselves to being labelled as youth challenges. However, the causes of Africa’s 
unemployment are far from straightforward in their youth-specificity. The purpose of this report is 
to avoid simply presuming Africa’s employment challenge to be inherently youth-specific by 
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assessing, empirically and conceptually, to what extent young people are actually specifically 
disadvantaged in accessing work.  
Defining ‘youth’ and who falls within the category ‘young people’ remains a challenge in itself. As 
discussed in Flynn, Mader, Oosterom, and Ripoll (2017: 12–15), various age-related cut-off 
points and descriptive definitions are used in different parts of the world and different policy 
spaces. Such age-based definitions offer statistical precision, but risk being arbitrary: commonly 
used ranges vary from as narrow as 16–24 years of age (for instance, used by the OECD) to as 
low as 10–24 years (used by DFID) and as wide as 15–36 years (as defined by the African Youth 
Charter and the African Development Bank) (AfDB, 2016b; 2016a).  
Descriptive or qualitative definitions, by contrast, highlight how 'youth’ is a relative and relational 
term referring to ‘a transitional social category that is socially constructed, historically situated 
and internally diverse’ (Ismail, 2016: i39). To follow Pierre Bourdieu (1993: 95): ‘One is always 
somebody’s senior or junior… youth and age are not self-evident data but are socially 
constructed.’ At the same time, many understandings highlight how ‘youth’ is about ‘transitioning’ 
from childhood into adulthood; for example, Moore (2015: 196) states that ‘“transition” is the 
defining feature of youthhood’.  
Because this paper explores barriers that young people may face during their initial transition(s) 
into the labour market – while bearing in mind that such transitions are not necessarily linear, and 
can entail forward as well as backward movements (for instance, between work and education) 
(Moore, 2015) – we adopt a transition-informed rather than age-defined understanding of youth. 
As regards the youth employment challenge, youth is understood as the period during which 
people take (or are expected to take) foundational steps in livelihood-building, be this at a 
relatively earlier or later period in their life.2 
Even more difficult – particularly in the context of many African economies – is to precisely define 
‘work’ or ‘employment’. The International Labour Organization (ILO) considers ‘work’ as 
comprising labour for payment, profit or family gain, as well as the unpaid production of goods 
and services, such as in volunteering and household sustenance (Lawrence, 2012: 7). The 2013 
World Development Report, Jobs, notes:  
For statisticians, a job is ‘a set of tasks and duties performed, or meant to be performed, 
by one person, including for an employer or in self-employment.’ Jobs are performed by 
the employed. These are defined as people who produce goods and services for the 
market or for their own use. (World Bank, 2012: 5) 
However, this broad definition appears rather artificial, by even containing self-employment and 
subsistence. To recognise the breadth of activities with a more sophisticated frame of reference 
while reflecting the ‘ambiguity’ of much informal employment, ‘debates on youth employment 
activities in the informal economy increasingly deploy the concept of “livelihoods”’ (Skinner, 2008, 
cited in Fortune et al., 2015: 15). But ‘livelihoods’ notions also risk being too encompassing if 
they obscure the heterogeneous nature of work; for instance, as Fox, Senbet, and Simbanegavi 
(2016: i9) highlight: 
                                                   
2 This thinking, we acknowledge, has its own risks. We might, for instance, not recognise a 25-year-old person 
who has held a stable job for the past five years, and recently lost it, as constituting part of the ‘youth employment 
challenge’. We would rather regard them as part of the unemployed adult labour force. 
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… [a] more common situation in Africa is full-time employment but low earnings (often 
with high income variability), and widespread underemployment (not being able to work 
as many hours as desired… It is not surprising, therefore, that some observers 
characterise the livelihoods of poor and working-class Africans as unemployment. 
These definitional challenges, in turn, engender challenges in using official statistics to paint an 
accurate picture of the scale of the employment challenge. As has often been noted, ‘measured 
unemployment is significantly higher in upper middle-income countries compared to low-income 
and lower middle-income countries [because] in low-income countries, which mostly do not have 
social safety nets for the unemployed, young people cannot afford to be idle’ (Dekker & 
Hollander, 2017: 3).  
Africa’s youth employment challenge consists not only of officially registered unemployment, but 
also of official and hidden underemployment, vulnerable employment and discouragement.3 The 
AfDB (2012) provides a helpful overview of such labour market categories, which it calls the 
‘Rosetta Stone for labour markets’ (Figure 1). Those statuses are highlighted below that may be 
considered to be parts of the youth employment challenge; lighter highlights indicate those that 
are partly problematic: ‘self-employed’ and ‘inactive’ (when involuntary, due to a lack of other 
options) and ‘informal’ work (often precarious and vulnerable). The AfDB (2016b) counts fully 
two-thirds of Africa’s non-student youth as unemployed, discouraged, or vulnerably employed. 
Figure 1: The ‘Rosetta Stone’ for labour markets 
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Source: Adapted from AfDB et al., (2012: 102). Highlights are the authors’ own. 
                                                   
3 ‘Discouraged’ is used here (and elsewhere in the literature) to refer to individuals of legal working age who have 
given up seeking employment, despite wanting to work, due to frustration over unsuccessful job search efforts.  
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Although reliable data on employment and livelihoods in Africa remain scarce, World Bank and 
ILO sources are seen as providing at least ‘a reasonably consistent picture’ (Cleland, 2017: 54). 
They find that about 65% of people rely on farming, about 20% on the non-agricultural informal 
sector, only around 15% are wage earners (most of whom work in sales and services), while only 
2%–3% are employed in industry (Cleland, 2017). However, many workers are affected to 
varying degrees by time-related underemployment (too few hours of remunerated work), 
‘invisible’ underemployment (an effective lack of work disguised by long hours at very low pay), 
and ‘vulnerable’ employment (which refers to work and self-employment without formal 
arrangements or access to social benefits, putting workers at high risk of poverty) (AfDB, 2018; 
Moore, 2015; Filmer & Fox, 2014). Estimates suggest that up to 77% of African workers are in 
vulnerable employment (ILO, 2014). While time-related underemployment is generally low (10%–
15%), except in agriculture (with seasonal variations), invisible underemployment is high, 
particularly in cities (AfDB, 2018).  
According to surveys conducted by the ILO in 20 developing countries, three-quarters of young 
people aged 15–29 are currently engaged in informal employment (Shehu & Nilsson, 2014). In 
the poorest African countries, the proportion of people working informally is as high as 90% 
(AfDB et al., 2012). The proportion of young people in the informal sector in Africa is ‘significantly 
higher’ than the share of adults (AfDB, 2012: 100). The AfDB (2016c: 1) moreover counts fully 
one-third of Africa’s nearly 420 million youth (aged 15–35) as ‘unemployed and discouraged’, 
another third as ‘vulnerably employed’, and only one in six as being in wage employment, noting 
that ‘youth face roughly double the unemployment rate of adults, with significant variation by 
country’.  
Table 1: Youth and adult unemployment rates in Africa 
 
Total Youth 
 
Adults 
 
  
Male Female Male Female 
World 6.0 12.4 12.7 4.3 4.9 
 Developing countries 5.4 11.6 12.1 3.5 4.2 
 Sub-Saharan Africa 7.6 10.7 12.2 5.9 6.5 
  East Africa 6.9 8.9 11.5 4.6 6.3 
  Central Africa 6.0 10.1 10.4 5.1 4.2 
  Southern Africa 24.9 45.5 53.9 18.2 22.8 
   (excluding South Africa) 25.5 37.0 49.9 17.5 22.0 
  West Africa 5.7 9.3 8.9 5.0 4.0 
Source: Adapted from Thurlow (2015: 30), based on data from the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) and the ILO. 
Estimates by Thurlow (2015) show youth unemployment rates across Africa being consistently 
between 1.5 and 2.5 times higher than adult rates (see Table 1). Calculations using ILO data 
(from 2011) also show that the unemployment rates of young people are always at least as high 
as adult unemployment rates or, in some countries, even more than three times higher (AfDB, 
2012: 107). As the AfDB (2016a: 121) summarises: ‘Countries with high youth unemployment 
also tend to have high adult unemployment, with the former exceeding the latter, [but] comparing 
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only unemployment rates hides vast differences in labour force participation across countries.’ A 
large share of the young population is often not even counted as economically active. 
From this snapshot of the data, it is clear that overall, young people in Africa are 
disproportionately disadvantaged in seeking work. They are more likely to be officially 
unemployed, and more likely to be engaged in informal or vulnerable forms of work. However, 
another perspective on the scale of the challenge can be gained from job creation and labour 
market entry statistics. According to one set of estimates, in the SSA region, 18 million jobs need 
to be created annually in order to absorb new entrants to the labour market (INCLUDE, 2017: 2), 
yet only 3 million formal jobs are created every year (AfDB, 2016c; INCLUDE, 2017). Even in the 
unlikely scenario of Africa experiencing as rapid and labour-intensive non-agricultural growth as 
East Asia did in the past, ‘enterprises would not be able to absorb the same share of the labour 
force because the labour force would just be too big’ (Fox & Oviedo, 2013: 7). Filmer and Fox 
(2014: 39) suggest that only 4% of new entrants between 2010 and 2020 will find waged work in 
industry, and 21% in waged services, while the remaining 75% will split almost evenly between 
household enterprise and agriculture. It is expected that, by 2030, 30 million youth will be 
entering the African labour market each year (Dekker & Hollander, 2017).  
3. How youth-specific are the causes?  
What factors will shape the employment prospects of these young people? And what policies 
may assist them? Answers will depend not least on understanding the extent to which the causes 
of the youth employment challenge are youth-specific: that is, what factors affect younger people 
in Africa more negatively than older people? As this section highlights, young people in Africa 
face many barriers in labour markets, but not all are youth-specific barriers; many formal barriers 
affect younger and older people alike. However, there are some significant barriers related to 
politics, patronage, and social norms that do disproportionately affect younger people. The 
evidence for each issue is summarised at the end of this section in a set of summary tables. 
Insufficient education and qualifications 
Many of the policy responses to Africa’s youth employment challenge have focused on delivering 
more and better education and training. Consequently, we must ask: to what extent are 
insufficient education and training of young people causes of the employment challenge? 
The social and economic benefits (to individuals and societies) from having a better-educated 
population are widely accepted. Access to formal education is empirically linked to a range of 
positive outcomes, from improved health (Agüero & Bharadwaj, 2014) to greater financial access 
(Sykes, Elder, Gurbuzer & Principi, 2016) and macroeconomic growth (Hanushek & 
Woessmann, 2015). Education can ‘transform lives, generate prosperity and promote social 
inclusion’ (OECD, 2015). Individual educational achievements generally lead to more successful 
labour market transitions into decent (and more stable) job, and bring a clear wage premium 
(Alderson & Nielsen, 2002; Anyanwu, 2013; Sparreboom & Staneva, 2014). Policy responses 
therefore often aim to deliver improved and expanded general education, vocational training, and 
education toward particular goals such as entrepreneurship.  
Young people in Africa have more formal education than ever before. As a result, they might 
actually be seen as more advantaged than older, less well-educated generations. Notably, the 
Millennium Development Goals spurred development actors to improve quality of and access to 
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education. Primary school completion rates across the SSA region have risen from lows of 53% 
(during the structural adjustment period which began in the 1980s) to highs of nearly 70% in 
2016. Lower secondary school completion rates have risen even more impressively, from 24% in 
1990 to 43% in 2016 (World Bank, 2018). Yet many spatial, financial and gendered barriers to 
achieving universal schooling persist, and young people’s ability to benefit from education is 
highly unequally distributed. Personal background critically affects the quality of learning, and, in 
particular, early childhood nutrition has been identified as critically related to cognitive 
development, having a lifelong impact on learning (Black, Victora, Walker, Bhutta, Christian, de 
Onis, Ezzati, Grantham-McGregor, Katz, Martorell, Uauy & Maternal and Child Nutrition Study 
Group, 2013). Hence, the potential quality of a young person’s education is already often 
determined well before their entering school.  
Moreover, particular obstacles to accessing and completing quality education often disadvantage 
females. Young girls are less likely to attend school and they stay in school for less time (Claves 
& Schoumaker, 2004). Societal norms and expectations about the domestic responsibilities of 
girls and young women in Africa compete with school attendance, and schooling can put young 
women at risk of sexual harassment. Early age pregnancies often dramatically affect young 
women’s ability to complete formal education (Ansell, 2004).  
Despite higher levels of formal educational attainment in recent years, young Africans are often 
still held to be insufficiently skilled for the continent’s existing and projected labour market (Fox et 
al., 2016). Secondary school leavers and university leavers are increasingly unable to find 
appropriate employment that makes best use of their formally accredited knowledge and skills. 
‘Skills mismatches’ are frequently cited as an obstacle in school-to-work transitions. Bhorat, 
Cassim, Kanburc, Stanwix and Yua (2016), for instance, observe what they describe as a chronic 
mismatch between the skills supplied by the South African education system and the economy’s 
demands. African education systems are habitually accused of not generating cadres of 
technically and functionally skilled graduates capable of satisfying the needs of ‘emerging’ 
markets. Sparreboom and Staneva (2014) suggest that a mismatch between the supply and 
demand of skills comes from, and has contributed to, a lack of trust and coordination between 
employers, education providers and labour. However, while labelling the problems associated 
with young people’s transitions from school into jobs as a ‘skills mismatch’ may be a convenient 
go-to explanation, it is far from robustly empirically supported in most cases. Finger-grained 
research is needed to better substantiate the degree and particular type of ‘skills mismatches’ in 
particular African labour markets, in order to inform appropriate policy responses.  
As the goal of education is to develop experience, skills and mindsets that allow people to 
succeed in work and in life, educational quality matters for realising this ‘promise’ (World Bank, 
2018). However, educational quality has only relatively recently attracted attention, with initiatives 
such as Education 2030 aiming to provide the majority of students with a certain defined 
minimum level of mathematics and reading skills (Altinok & Aydemir, 2017). Skills are linked with 
a wider discussion about the unclear quality of degrees and difficult choices younger people must 
make around education (cf. Porter, 2014). For example, in interviews conducted in Nigeria by 
Chari, Flynn, Mader, Mwaura, Oosterom, Roelen, Sam-Kpakra, Shittu, and Sumberg (2017), 
senior bank managers stated that applicants needed to have a degree from federal universities; 
non-federal university degrees were not viewed as reliable skill indicators. Yet, as Fox and 
Thomas (2016) highlight, most African youth face very nebulous, non-linear pathways from 
schooling into jobs, and it is left to them and their families to assess the (often opaque) longer-
term consequences of different education options, from a position of potentially limited 
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understanding of future labour markets and the opportunities which particular educational 
choices may offer. Choosing among the growing array of education options is often financially 
risky. One conclusion that can be drawn, as Darko and Lowe (2016) do in their analysis of youth 
employment opportunities in Ghana’s growing construction sector, is that young people may 
require better ‘education’ about their further education opportunities. However, Sparreboom and 
Staneva (2014) found no evidence that younger people had greater difficulties in assessing 
potential labour market returns from different educational investments (particularly beyond the 
immediate term) than older people.  
Education itself can promote job market inclusion as well as exclusion, particularly in Africa’s 
bifurcated labour markets. For those who are able to leverage their education into employment, 
the financial rewards differ widely between wage employment (where further schooling mostly 
leads to higher incomes) and self-employment (where financial returns from education are far 
less certain) (Sparreboom & Staneva, 2014). The timing of a school-to-work transition during 
one’s youth seems to have a particularly salient impact on attaining more or less advantageous 
positions in the workforce over the course of a lifetime; how individuals first enter the labour 
market affects their final earnings strongly. This ‘entrapment’ means that people who enter the 
labour market in more disadvantaged positions, such as in household enterprises (self-
employed, or as unpaid family workers), are often penalised in future (Bridges, Fox, Gaggeroa & 
Owensa, 2017).  
Furthermore, as workforces become better educated, formal qualifications increasingly become a 
prerequisite for accessing more decent jobs, even if the number of opportunities does not 
increase proportionately; in turn, lower-skilled individuals face higher risks of unemployment and 
exclusion (Bell & Blanchflower, 2011). Yet even successful completion of tertiary education, 
which is generally positively linked to increased earnings in the formal sector, is not a guarantee 
of formal employment. For instance, Locke and te Lintelo (2012) found that higher education in 
Zambia was in fact associated with lower employment rates (Fortune, Ismail & Stephen, 2015). 
Consequently, the informal sector has become the dominant place where even many formally 
educated African youth, in addition to school-leavers, integrate into the labour market, gain job 
experience, and even develop a sense of professionalisation (Pasquier-Doumer, 2012).  
Although working informally despite having more formal qualifications may affect younger people 
more often, the causes are not directly youth-specific, in the sense of younger people lacking 
what older generations have. Indeed, the increasingly competitive race for qualifications may 
disadvantage those who cannot keep up or who stumble over the wrong choices. One 
undeniable fact, however, is that young people do have a particular structural disadvantage in 
terms of being fundamentally less experienced than older adults, which presents a high initial 
hurdle to accessing jobs. The ‘experience gap’ is a well-established phenomenon in labour 
markets globally; regression models in the ILO’s School to Work Transition studies show that age 
positively correlates with employment. In other words, individuals start off with less advantageous 
positions, but as they grow older, their probability of participating in the labour market, searching 
for, and finding a job increases (Nilsson, 2015). What is perhaps most starkly ‘youth-specific’ 
here is that unemployment experienced during the formative labour market entry years, which 
typically coincide with ‘youth’, may have severe long-term consequences. 
In sum, although African young people now enjoy more formal education, often completing 
secondary school or even having a university degree, problems in quality and unequal access 
persist. Having completed education by no means guarantees securing decent employment 
(Bajaj, 2009). In an environment where there are far fewer jobs than there are job-seekers, 
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increasing individuals’ qualification levels does little to address the reality of there being still too 
few jobs. Put differently, even if more (or better) education increases the likelihood of an 
individual young person getting a job, collectively this can merely make the competition for a 
limited number of positions even fiercer. This strongly implies that the causes of Africa’s youth 
employment challenge cannot be explained or addressed solely via a focus on education. 
Insufficient achievement in education (failing to gain skills or formal qualifications) can be a 
crucial barrier to employment, but this is only youth-specific to the extent that formal education 
may today play an even greater role than in the past. Older people in Africa are even less likely 
to be formally educated or qualified. Yet young people are potentially additionally disadvantaged 
by having to face more complex and uncertain educational choices than ever before, and by the 
simple fact of being at a crucial stage in their lives where the right timing and decisions in relation 
to employment have the greatest consequences. 
Table 2: How youth-specific are insufficient education and qualifications as a barrier to 
employment?  
Factor: 
insufficient 
education and 
qualifications 
Are youth disadvantaged? Explanation 
Logic says Evidence says 
Lack of 
education 
no no 
Young people in Africa are more and 
better educated than ever before. 
Skills mismatch / 
quality problem 
no no 
There is a skills mismatch and quality 
problem, but this does not 
disproportionately apply to younger 
people. 
Experience gap yes yes 
Young people lack the job experience 
which is valued in hiring decisions. 
More complex 
education 
choices 
yes (yes) 
Younger people face greater 
educational uncertainty. 
Source: authors.  
Prohibitive legal and governance frameworks  
Over-regulation and market rigidity as constraints on job expansion have been put forward as 
contributing to the youth unemployment challenge (Page, 2012; Owusu, Yankson & Osei, 2016). 
We cannot address in full the broad question about the extent to which these truly prevent growth 
and job creation in Africa. However, we can examine the extent to which ‘business environment’ 
factors may disproportionately disadvantage young people. 
Do labour laws in African countries specifically constrain young people? The broader impacts of 
minimum wage and employee protection regulations on employment rates continue to be 
contentiously debated. Fox and Oviedo (2013) emphasise that little is currently known about the 
actual impacts of labour market regulation in Africa. While many economists now agree that 
minimum wages are unlikely to weaken general employment rates when set moderately, 
concerns remain that young people (as ‘outsiders’ to the job market) may be more likely to suffer 
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any exclusionary effects caused by inappropriate rates (OECD, 2015). While a number of studies 
have probed the impacts of minimum wages on youth unemployment, they focus mainly on 
OECD countries, and Broecke, Forti and Vandeweyer (2017) caution that higher rates of 
informality and low levels of labour law compliance in developing countries potentially limit the 
transferability of findings.  
African labour law regimes and their levels of enforcement vary widely. Nascent investigations of 
the impacts of minimum wage laws on youth employment in Africa present mixed findings, and 
currently do not prove that minimum wage laws clearly disadvantage younger people in finding 
employment. A recent study of business environment factors and youth employment found little 
evidence that minimum wage or employee protection legislations constrained job access in 
Sierra Leone, Kenya and Nigeria, although it also highlighted widespread non-enforcement of 
labour laws (Chari et al., 2017). Similarly, in six sectors of South Africa’s economy, no significant 
difference was observed between the outcomes from minimum wages in terms of youth 
employment versus adult employment, although higher levels of non-compliance with minimum 
wage laws for younger employees were observed (Bhorat et al., 2016). These findings echo 
those of Bördős, Csillag, O’Higgins and Scharle (2017), whose comprehensive study on youth 
employment and minimum wages4 concluded that the evidence shows ‘no reason to modify the 
viewpoint expressed 15 years ago that the impact of minimum wages on youth employment 
seems to be either small or not statistically significant, or both’ (Bördős et al. in O’Higgins, 2017: 
43). Nonetheless, the authors of that study go on to make two linked ‘youth-specific’ observations 
about institutional labour market factors: 
… evidence supports the notion that strong [employment protection legislation] mitigates 
any negative youth employment effects associated with raising young people’s minimum 
wages. There is also somewhat weaker evidence to support the notion that strong and 
coordinated, but decentralized, collective bargaining also mitigates any negative youth 
employment effects of minimum wage rises. (Bördős et al. in O’Higgins, 2017: 43) 
Empirical findings on employee protection regulation and young people’s employment are also 
sparse. In South Africa, Fox and Oviedo (2013) found little evidence for regulations having a 
strong negative effect on job growth, therefore suggesting that labour regulation ‘reform’ 
(deregulation) might have smaller employment payoffs than is often expected. Perhaps the 
strongest youth-specific consequence of employee protection regulations lies in the fact that 
younger people are less likely to benefit. Unemployment insurance, for instance, typically 
requires a minimum period of employment; younger people are often less secure in their 
employment relationships, entitled to the fewest benefits, and most susceptible to layoffs during 
periods of recession (Bell & Blanchflower, 2011; Baah-Boateng, 2013) and exclusion during 
hiring freezes (Anyanwu, 2013). While young people could stand to benefit most from greater 
protection, they are least likely to. 
Beyond labour laws, other business environment regulatory frameworks (such as those 
governing property rights and financial regulation, or taxation) may influence business activities 
in ways that affect young Africans. International comparisons often focus on the ‘ease of doing 
business’, with regulatory burdens and poor institutional environments argued to prevent 
                                                   
4 Their study was based on 328 effects from 43 papers published since 1990, and covered data on high-income 
and middle-income countries, but did not cover low-income countries for the obvious fact that many do not have 
employment protection legislation.  
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entrepreneurship that could generate economic growth and employment, particularly through the 
emergence and growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Nuwagaba & Nzewi, 2013). In 
this context, do business environment factors disproportionately harm young people?  
The available empirical data on the effects of business environment reform (BER) on young 
people’s employment opportunities are varied. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is little evidence 
that youth-owned SMEs are differentially affected by general business environment constraints. 
In a study of 900 youth-owned SMEs in Ethiopia, Amhaa and Woldehanna (2016) found that the 
tax regime and business licensing were relatively inconsequential as constraints on youth-owned 
SMEs, while policy predictability (stability) was very important (ibid.). A key assumption behind 
BER is that most SMEs are growth-oriented; however, literature on entrepreneurship in 
developing contexts often clearly distinguishes ‘growth-oriented’ from ‘survival-oriented’ 
enterprises, which operate on a different logic (Berner, Gomez & Knorringa, 2012). Businesses 
founded by owners who believe in their ability to capture market opportunities have far greater 
potential to grow than those initiated by individuals who primarily seek to fulfil the subsistence 
needs of their household (Amhaa & Woldehanna, 2016).  
This nuance is often understated or overlooked in thinking about youth entrepreneurship. Some 
young African entrepreneurs may be seeking to create ‘Africa’s Google’ or ‘Africa’s Uber’, but 
evidence suggests the vast majority of young Africans who create SMEs have entered 
entrepreneurship as a ‘plan B’, and would prefer stable wage jobs (Al-Samarrai & Bennell, 2007; 
Owusu et al., 2016). For example, Namatovu, Langevang, Dawa, and Kyejjusa, in Gough and 
Langevang (2016), find that the rate of total early-stage entrepreneurial activity5 in Uganda is 
higher among youth than adults, and interpret this as demonstrating the attractiveness of 
entrepreneurship for youths. But the characteristics of the youth entrepreneurs they uncover – 
often less formally educated, running a business ‘on the side’ while employed in low-earning jobs 
– and young people’s own assessments of entrepreneurship actually suggest the majority to be 
necessity-driven. Many Ethiopian young SME owners also cited ‘lack of other options’ as a 
primary driver for starting their business (Amhaa & Woldehanna, 2016).  
Lastly, lack of access to finance is often cited as a barrier to youth employment or to investing in 
one’s own education. Youth do make up a disproportionately large share of the unbanked 
persons worldwide and, in Africa, youth are more likely to use informal finance providers than 
formal providers (Sykes et al., 2016). However, the causal mechanisms leading from financial 
inclusion to employment and empowerment outcomes remain very poorly understood (Sykes et 
al., 2016; Mader, 2018a). In particular, interventions focused on individual savings seem to have 
the weakest links to positive employment outcomes, whereas appropriately targeted enterprise 
finance programmes have the greatest job creation potential when they focus on providing larger 
amounts of credit to young people who already run growth-oriented businesses (Sykes et al., 
2016; Flynn & Sumberg, 2018). Widespread youth financial inclusion efforts may not have a 
significant employment effect. Also, youth SME owners report business support services being 
equally or more important than access to finance for business growth (Amhaa & Woldehanna, 
2016). 
To sum up, some initial inferences can be drawn, but large uncertainties remain. The 
enforcement of existing labour laws in Africa is inconsistent at best, and it is unclear to what 
                                                   
5 Total early-stage entrepreneurial activity (TEA) is defined by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor as ‘the 
proportion of the population that owns either a nascent business (less than six months old) or a new business 
(less than 3.5 years old)’ (Namatovu et al., in Gough and Langavang, 2016). 
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extent these laws affect young people positively or negatively in practice. Consequently, it is 
uncertain to what degree efforts to liberalise and reform labour market regulations would affect 
young people. There is little doubt that business environments affect African entrepreneurs’ 
success, but many qualifiers attach. This is particularly the case for young people, whose 
entrepreneurship is often necessity- rather than growth-driven, and who do not widely report 
regulation to be stifling their efforts. Although young people find it harder to access formal 
finance, the effects of this are uncertain and, in terms of job creation, finance appears to be 
lacking where it matters most – namely for existing, larger SMEs with growth potential (cf. 
Bateman & Chang, 2012). 
Table 3: How youth-specific are legal and governance frameworks as a barrier to 
employment? 
Factor: 
prohibitive legal 
and governance 
frameworks 
Are youth disadvantaged? Explanation 
Logic says Evidence says 
Labour laws maybe ? 
Jobless young people could be 
disadvantaged by labour laws that 
favour ‘insiders’, but enforcement is 
rare; evidence on effects is scarce. 
Business 
environment 
no ? 
The business environment is likely to 
have evenly spread effects; young 
people are less likely to run growth-
oriented SMEs, and do not report 
being disadvantaged. 
Access to 
finance 
yes (yes) ? 
Younger people have less access to 
finance, but the effects on their 
employment and entrepreneurship 
prospects appear small. 
Source: authors. 
Infrastructure constraints  
Improvements to infrastructure, when coupled with better human development outcomes, 
promise to drive economic growth and poverty reduction. The African continent’s infrastructure 
deficit is widely viewed as a critical barrier to economic improvement (Mafusire et al., 2010).  
Conceptually, there are many possible linkages between improved infrastructure and 
employment outcomes. These include better education creating a more skilled population and 
competitive workforce, better road networks and other transportation infrastructure helping 
increase access to education and health and financial services, and transport and energy access 
both directly and indirectly enabling job creation – not least through intensified agricultural and 
non-farm activity in rural areas (Porter, 2014). In this section, we do not debate the wider merits 
of improvements to infrastructure for economic growth and job creation. However, we examine 
how barriers resulting from insufficient infrastructure in Africa might specifically affect younger 
people. We find the youth-specificity of the infrastructure barriers we examine to be indistinct. To 
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illustrate, we briefly examine three areas6 of infrastructure development: transportation, power, 
and ICTs.  
Poor-quality road networks and insufficient public transportation are daily challenges in Africa. 
Rural communities are isolated from social services (if they exist) and their potential for market-
oriented agricultural livelihoods is undermined (Porter, 2011). For women, safe, affordable and 
reliable transport options are particularly important in reaching surrounding markets as a key 
source of livelihoods (ibid.). For young people, job search efficiency often requires travelling to 
different locations away from where they live (Smith & Zenou, 2003). While they use the same 
roads and transport systems as everyone else, young people may have a harder time affording 
transportation, and this may discourage access to potential jobs. Improving road networks and 
public transportation undoubtedly would bring significant positive impacts to many African 
communities, but transportation infrastructure in and of itself does not automatically have a 
positive impact on all: for instance, in some instances highway development has also been linked 
to reducing women’s market access and increasing their exposure to HIV (due to commerce 
along trucking routes) (Porter, 2011).  
Severe challenges in providing stable, affordable energy affect many African economies, 
particularly as inconsistent power supply reduces general productivity, and its mitigation poses 
additional costs (Berner et al., 2012). Energy crises, such as Ghana’s recent ‘dumsor’ 
experiences,7 affect not only the industrial sector but also family-run SMEs, as electricity-
dependent businesses (such as cold stores and hair salons) struggle with the costs of private 
power generation. While Ethiopian young entrepreneurs cite inconsistent power supply as one of 
the top five impediments to running and growing their businesses (Amhaa & Woldehanna, 2016), 
it is not plausible conversely to assume that lack of energy infrastructure would significantly 
disadvantage youth relative to older adults. 
Regarding ICTs, is the picture any different? The rapid expansion of ICT access across Africa 
has engendered great optimism as they enable access to information and facilitate social 
network connectivity across greater spaces. Mobile phones in particular are changing how many 
African households and family networks operate (Porter, 2014). Improvements to ICT 
infrastructure tend to improve labour activity rates (Chen, 2004). The impact of the growing 
telecommunications industry (telcos) in Africa on youth employment has not yet been closely 
investigated; however, initial studies from Ghana suggest positive links between telco expansion 
and increases in job availability, both in terms of relatively higher-paying telco office jobs and 
microbusinesses selling phone credit and accessories (Boateng. Koufie & Yellen, 2011; Afutu-
Kotey, Gough & Owusu, 2017). To what extent younger people specifically benefit from new 
telecom-related jobs relative to older people is, however, indeterminate. What is clearer is that 
young people have greater access to ICTs, especially internet services, than older adults; 20% of 
youth access internet services compared to 8% of those aged 45 years or older (World Bank, 
2016). There is ample evidence that young Africans are integrating ICTs into their job search and 
job creation strategies (Ismail, 2016).  
                                                   
6 Leaving aside education, which we have dealt with above. 
7 ‘Dumsor’ is a Ghanaian term used to describe irregular and unpredictable power outages. SMEs in Ghana were 
estimated to lose $2.2 million daily, or about $686.4 million annually, due to recurrent power shortages over the 
past three years, according to the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER).  
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The uptake of ICTs by young people has spurred enthusiasm for ‘digital entrepreneurship’ and 
assorted policies promoting ICT as a means to address the African youth unemployment 
challenge. Technology business incubators and accelerators like MEST8 and Impact Hub9 seek 
to support digital business creation, particularly in yet-to-be-realised centres like Kenya’s ‘Silicon 
Savannah’. As Ismail (2016) suggests, the potential of ICTs to reduce youth unemployment 
remains hampered by inadequate ICT infrastructure, especially internet access, and few African 
governments have matched their rhetorical fervour with investments in equitable ICT access. In 
reality, the number of African youth who are making a living in digital jobs is still fairly small 
(Ismail, 2016). In addition, Sumberg and Hunt (2018) warn against current essentialist portrayals 
of young people as inherently more ‘tech innovative’ or ‘ICT savvy’. They argue that, while young 
people may be more technologically connected than older people, ‘the picture is very muddy’ 
with regard to claims that significant numbers of young Africans are innovative ‘digital natives’, or 
that they find work in sectors such as agriculture more attractive when it is linked to ICTs. Yet, as 
mobile phone penetration and social media usage increase, other channels may open: young 
Africans may share problems and frustrations, support each other, and potentially organise 
themselves in relation to their employment experiences using ICTs (Fortune et al., 2015). 
In sum, as might be expected, infrastructure does not represent a very youth-specific 
employment constraint, despite its apparent importance across the board. Poor roads and power 
delivery affect all ages in similar ways. There is strong evidence that young people are more 
likely to use ICTs, and thus more affected by ICT infrastructure being unavailable or poor quality; 
but evidence is rather weak regarding the assumption that young people can use ICTs to 
leverage access to or create new jobs. Essentialist thinking about young people being inherently 
innovative and likely to drive a digital entrepreneurship revolution is empirically untenable. 
Table 4: How youth-specific are infrastructure constraints as a barrier to employment?   
Factor: 
infrastructure 
constraints 
Are youth disadvantaged? Explanation 
Logic says Evidence says 
Roads & 
transport 
no mixed 
Transport/roads have evenly spread 
effects (not necessarily all positive). 
Power no no 
Lack of power negatively impacts 
businesses run by people of all ages. 
ICT possibly possibly 
Younger people are more likely to use 
ICTs, but evidence is still weak on 
how they use them to find/create jobs. 
Source: authors. 
                                                   
8 The Meltwater Entrepreneurial School of Technology (MEST) offers training programmes, seed funding and 
business incubation to young African technology entrepreneurs from Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa. 
9 Impact Hub self-describes as ‘part innovation lab, part business incubator, part social enterprise community 
centre’ with co-working spaces in Kigali, Accra, Bamako, Lagos, Harare, Khartoum, Johannesburg and 
Bujumbura. 
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Socio-cultural norms 
Young people have expectations about the work they would like to do, and older people have 
expectations about the work younger people ought to do. These views, while related, are not 
always comfortably aligned. Aspirations can be stymied by labour market conditions, legitimate 
efforts can be thwarted by discriminatory or essentialist attitudes and/or ambitions held back by 
conflicting norms. These represent strong (albeit informal) barriers that a person of any age 
might face, and which are likely to be at least partly class- and gender-specific. To what extent 
are they also youth-specific?  
How different societies define ‘youth’, how young people see themselves, and the cultural 
models that define what is expected from young men and young women in a given context all 
shape what it means to be a ‘young’ person. As Oosterom, Kache, Mususa and Pswarayi (2016) 
argue, societies make ‘potentially important distinctions between young people and adults’ and 
there are ‘different cultural models and everyday discourses about morality that prescribe moral 
behaviour for young people’. Youth-specific moral expectations shape young people’s livelihood 
options, with gendered norms hugely complicating the societal expectations that young people 
contend with as they navigate among different options in the world of work.  
Although common perceptions of systematic discrimination against women in African job markets 
are not always borne out by empirical evidence – notably, the difference between male and 
female labour force participation rates in Africa is the lowest in the world – there is strong 
evidence that gender norms put up important informal barriers to employment for young women 
(Nilsson, 2015; Al-Samarrai & Bennell, 2007; Chari et al., 2017). In many African societies, 
strongly held societal perceptions of what is gender-appropriate work affect young people’s 
choices. Evidence of the impact of this can be found in how female school-leavers’ employment 
tends to be confined to a much narrower set of occupations than men (Al-Samarrai & Bennell, 
2007). Jobs traditionally considered more appropriate for women include hairdressing, tailoring 
and catering, all of which can take place in or near the home (Fortune et al., 2015; Oosterom et 
al., 2016). Notably, 25% of African women have their first child or become pregnant between the 
ages of 15 and 19, while men tend to become parents later in life; women face far greater trade-
offs of childcare against continued education or seeking work (Fox et al., 2016). Young women 
also often avoid certain forms of work, even if these are better-paid, because they are considered 
risky or inappropriate. Lahai (2012) described how women in urban Sierra Leone chose to sell 
cold water rather than engage in foreign currency exchange, because carrying cash exposed 
them to risks of violence, including sometimes from their husbands. Male household members, 
such as fathers or husbands, can also prescribe appropriate work locations or the extent of travel 
for women (Chari et al., 2017). Gough, Chigunta and Langevang (2016) described expectations 
among young women that they will need to offer sexual favours for employment, both at interview 
stage and subsequently in employment.  
Mobility is a key asset in being able to reach better job options, and African societies often have 
pronounced norms regarding youth mobility, which are closely tied to gender. Livelihood options 
that require travel generally may be coded as masculine and seen by young women themselves 
as potential threats to their reputation and physical safety. In Mali, for example, young men who 
migrate for work are seen as making an essential contribution to a family’s livelihood, gaining 
higher family status and social recognition for what is seen as part of traditional rites of passage 
into adulthood, whereas female migration is viewed suspiciously and stigmatised (Hertrich & 
Lesclingand, 2013). For rural women, potential off-farm job openings, which are an important 
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factor in diversifying livelihoods, may be restricted by the dual constraints of distance and travel 
restrictions (Porter, 2011).  
Social norms also more broadly dictate whether an employment opportunity counts as a ‘proper’ 
job. The definition of ‘proper’ work by many families and communities goes far beyond the World 
Bank’s definition of a ‘job’ as an activity that ‘generate[s] income, monetary or in kind, without 
violating human rights’ (Batmanglich & Enria, 2014). Different types of work are associated with 
vastly differing social status (Oosterom et al., 2016). The ‘right’ jobs not only earn incomes but 
also social respect, and naturally not all jobs command the same respect. ‘Formal’ jobs are seen 
across many African societies as more prestigious than entrepreneurship, in spite of (or perhaps 
because of) small-scale entrepreneurship’s prevalence. In many African countries, most ‘formal’ 
jobs are still public sector jobs; for example, estimates from Sierra Leone suggest there may be 
only 100,000 formal jobs in total, of which the public sector offers the majority (Chari et al., 2017). 
Gough et al. (2016) report that Zambian youth see public sector jobs as some of the most 
desirable, thanks to the regular income and low likelihood of being fired, even though 
government salaries are increasingly seen as insufficient. Yet, public employment has 
substantially declined since structural adjustment began in the 1980s, and data from East Africa 
show a much smaller proportion of well-educated under-30s entering state jobs than those who 
entered the labour force two decades before (Simson, 2016).  
While public sector jobs may be socially respectable and desirable – particularly given a scarcity 
of other formal options – to expand public sector payrolls is not widely considered to be a viable 
solution. Even as the public sector continues to be an important (and above all respected) 
employer, government and donor employment programmes have usually turned to the private 
sector, and particularly the idea of entrepreneurship, as offering solutions to the African youth 
employment challenge (Batmanglich & Enria, 2014). However, the degree to which 
entrepreneurship, including youth entrepreneurship, is socially viewed as legitimate and 
accepted varies by socio-cultural context (Owusu et al., 2016). Idealised jobs, often referred to as 
‘serious’ or ‘proper’ jobs, tend to be associated with having a contract, a regular salary, social 
security and income tax, perhaps some benefits, and a level of employment stability (Esson, 
2013).  
Negative societal views of some of the most viable current private sector employment options 
can discourage youth from considering them. For example, although the construction sector is 
seen as having growing employment potential in many countries, in Ghana, working in 
construction does not enjoy a positive image, which deters young people or condemns them to 
participate as a last choice (which reinforces the negative image) (Darko & Lowe, 2016). Another 
common example of a relatively profitable, widespread livelihood option for young people 
(typically men) that fails to qualify as a ‘proper’ job is okada (motorcycle taxis). Okadas have 
become commonplace throughout West Africa, and often are the dominant transportation option, 
particularly in rural communities. However, okada riding has negative social perceptions and is 
demeaned as ‘young man’s work’, only suitable for earning ‘quick money for the day, to eat, 
drink, possibly smoke jamba (marijuana), maybe gamble a little, but unfit to feed a family and 
sustain an orderly and responsible lifestyle’ (Menzel, 2011). The work is physically demanding, 
and it is rare to find anyone over the age of 40 years actively working as an okadaman, yet in 
reality okada-riding fathers and sons sustain many families (Fortune et al., 2015). Okada-riding 
thus aptly illustrates the paradox many young Africans face: the jobs that may enable them to 
escape economic dependence also carry social and moral stigma. As Bürge (2011) argues, this 
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denies young people a chance to enjoy both moral and economic success and slows down their 
socioeconomic progression into ‘adulthood’.  
In the ‘formal’ sector, employers also often hold youth-specific biases and beliefs about young 
people’s capacities. Market analysis from the Prospects Liberia programme10 found that Liberian 
employers often questioned the skills, trustworthiness and character of young people by default: 
‘[One of our] biggest challenges in hiring are finding honest workers who show up on time and 
want to work’ (Topulli, 2016). Liberian employers listed previous work experience (46%), 
educational level (29%) and personal skills (21%) as most important when hiring for formal jobs 
(ibid.). These results reinforce Chari et al.’s (2017) finding that young people often encounter 
‘experience traps’, where employers inherently prefer older candidates. However, not all 
perceptions of young workers held by potential employers are negative: limited sectoral evidence 
suggests that certain employers may target younger people because of their potential 
productivity and cost advantages over older workers, and younger people are sometimes 
considered more trainable (Chari et al., 2017). 
Unsurprisingly, young people often internalise societal expectations and norms. As a result, even 
relatively successful livelihood strategies in the informal economy are not always viewed by the 
young people who pursue them as ‘work’ because of the negative connotations attached to them 
(Batmanglich & Enria, 2014). One of Chari et al.’s (2017) key findings is that, contrary to the 
current hype about youth entrepreneurship, young people in Sierra Leone, Kenya and Nigeria 
demonstrate strong desires (particularly those who are more educated) to obtain salaried 
employment, and relatively little interest in entrepreneurship. Even when they obtained a formal 
sector waged job, ‘to further my studies’ was the second most important reason for young people 
to have left their last job (Chari et al., 2017). This indicates that young people are aspirational 
and pragmatic, and not necessarily seeking the ‘quick fix’ which some policy-makers seek 
through promoting youth entrepreneurship.  
Differences between official descriptions and how young people describe their own situations are 
telling: a Q-methodology-based study of Kenyan youths’ jobs aspirations found young people 
being capable of conceptualising both the employment problems they faced and what they 
perceived as necessary measures to solve them, but there were major gaps with how 
government officials perceived the issue (Mukutu, 2011). As an Afrobarometer study from 
Zambia (Mujenja, 2014) found, citizens’ perceptions of unemployment rates differ widely from 
official figures. Similarly, young people working in the informal economy often describe 
themselves as unemployed, despite working up to 80 hours a week, and despite the importance 
attached to the informal economy in contemporary development economics (Fortune et al., 
2015). These insights clarify that Africa’s youth employment crisis is not simply about a shortage 
of work, but of ‘real’ and reputable jobs that match societal norms and ideals.  
  
                                                   
10 Prospects Liberia is a youth empowerment program implemented by Mercy Corps and funded by the Swedish 
Embassy in Liberia and Chevron. 
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Table 5: How youth-specific are socio-cultural norms as a barrier to employment? 
Factor:  
socio-cultural 
norms 
Are youth disadvantaged? Explanation 
Logic says Evidence says 
Restrictive 
gender norms 
maybe 
(yes for 
women) 
Younger women may be 
disadvantaged relatively to older 
women if they are under greater 
pressure to conform and must forego 
more opportunities. 
(im)mobility mixed mixed 
Young people may be more mobile 
than older people, but it varies across 
persons (particularly genders). 
Societal ideas 
about a ‘proper’ 
job 
yes yes 
Much of the work that young Africans 
do is not seen as ‘proper’ work; 
entrepreneurship is often not 
attractive. 
Employer beliefs 
about young 
people 
yes mixed 
Many employers have biases against 
hiring younger (or less experienced) 
people; however, there is also limited 
evidence of pro-youth biases. 
Source: authors. 
Social networks, patronage and politics 
In an environment with few jobs and many job-seekers, patronage and social networks can be 
key factors in gaining work. Family ties significantly influence the starting point from which young 
people join labour markets, and as one progresses in the world of work, ‘who you know’ matters 
– for older and younger people alike. However, while social networks and patronage 
relationships may prevent young people from accessing some jobs, they might also help them 
find others. Moreover, the politics of local job markets have complex and differential effects.  
Family has a significant impact on individuals’ initial job projects. Family size and birth order have 
been shown to affect educational outcomes, with inequalities that occur during education-age 
years likely to persist in the labour market (Nilsson, 2015). Parents’ and siblings’ education and 
economic status can affect a young person’s employment outcomes in various ways. The family 
network effect works through parents whose own levels of education and social networks can 
advantage or disadvantage their offspring (Shehu & Nilsson, 2014), as educated parents are 
better situated in the workforce, more informed about job opportunities, and more capable of 
supporting their children in successful and rapid school-to-work transitions.  
In the SSS region, young people tend to work in roughly the same sectors and types of jobs as 
their parents (Fox & Thomas, 2016). In addition, young Africans whose siblings are employed 
have fewer and shorter unemployment periods (Nilsson, 2015), and having ‘successful’ siblings 
decreases the time it takes to get one’s first job (Guénard & Nilsson, 2015). However, Pasquier-
Doumer (2012) noted that having a self-employed parent (father) did not necessarily result in 
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intergenerational transmission of entrepreneurial skills, though it may advantage young people if 
they choose to enter the same sector as ‘the family business’, due to intergenerational 
transmission of industry insights and useful networks. The performance of intergenerational 
SMEs, especially household businesses, depends greatly on the support of a family and kinship 
network (Nordman, 2016). In brief, data from African countries indicate that family and kinship 
networks significantly impact how people get jobs and start businesses. While family dynamics 
may be of little legislative use to policy-makers, their presence strongly suggests that policies 
aimed at individuals will spill over to benefit siblings and offspring. 
Social network effects on employment access more broadly are well-established in labour 
markets research. Information about opportunities circulates along interpersonal networks, as 
people talk to friends and acquaintances about available jobs and about whom to do business 
with (Fafchamps, 2000). A large and growing literature has established the link between labour 
market dynamics (including wages) and friends and acquaintances, which prevails in virtually all 
labour markets (Jackson, 2010). There is strong evidence that informal networks are important in 
accessing the labour market in developing countries. Nordman and Pasquier-Doumer’s (2015) 
study of social networks in Burkina Faso suggests that network size and strength of ties 
significantly correlate with labour market transitions; lack of access to social networks is 
consequently a significant ‘informal barrier’ for younger job-seekers (Chari et al., 2017). While 
social networks are perceived as extremely important in connecting young Africans with potential 
jobs (including by young Africans themselves), the networks of friends, affiliates and professional 
acquaintances that young people have tend to place them at a disadvantage. Young people may 
lack information about opportunities, and may not understand what actions might allow them to 
capture these opportunities (Fox & Thomas, 2016). Moreover, youth-specific network 
disadvantages include a lack of strong, relevant networks or social capital that connects them to 
relevant jobs (Bhorat et al., 2016).  
Patronage is, by definition, non-meritocratic access – for example, to jobs distributed on the 
basis of identity (ethnic, religious, social, personal) and political influence, rather than skills and 
experience (Simson, 2016). The significant imbalance between supply and demand in most 
African formal labour markets provides much of ‘the necessary oxygen’ for patronage and 
political influence in the market (Chari et al., 2017). While patronage-based job access privileges 
some young people, it excludes others. A significant proportion of young people in Sierra Leone, 
Kenya and Nigeria claimed that unfair recruitment and discrimination were reasons for their lack 
of success in recent job searches. When asked about friends who were more successful, 67% of 
respondents thought their friends found better jobs because ‘they have good connections’ and 
only 45% because ‘they are well qualified’ (Chari et al., 2017). Findings from the Prospects 
Liberia assessment revealed that young Liberians’ most common strategy to find jobs is asking 
family and friends (78%) and other contacts in the community (48%). Young people, 
predominantly men, perceived this method as ‘always’ or ‘sometimes’ effective, and far more 
effective than other methods such as newspaper-reading, radio-listening, or checking notice 
boards; however, many women respondents expressed exclusion from the ‘boys’ club’ (Topulli, 
2016). Research by Philipps (2013) and Hoffman (2011) shows how young men in urban areas 
of Guinea and Sierra Leone draw on rural/kin-based networks to strategically access livelihood 
opportunities; social and kin networks also play an important role in recruiting for more nefarious 
livelihood options, such as drug smuggling (Fortune et al., 2015).  
To summarise, patronage networks may provide a (relatively effective) ‘workaround’ for the 
issues of insufficient job availability and steep competition, if one is ‘in’ well-positioned networks. 
20 
Evidence and logic suggest that young people may be more disadvantaged by virtue of having 
had less opportunity to develop the ‘right’ networks – largely based on their labour market 
inexperience.  
Batmanglich and Enria (2014) argued that it has become commonplace to discuss youth 
employment issues and responses to them in either economic or technical terms, while avoiding 
the political dimension. However, political actors in Africa are frequently accused of channelling 
resources to regime loyalists, including to young people affiliated (strongly or loosely) with the 
incumbent party (Hansen, 2010). Although the mixed and complex ways in which local politics 
shape access to employment and livelihood opportunities will affect adults as much as young 
people, they could disadvantage youth more, inasmuch as younger people are unlikely to be at 
the head of patronage-disbursing networks. Informal tactics of patronage work against the 
employment and livelihood opportunities of young people who refuse to buy into such networks 
(Honwana, 2011; Oosterom et al., 2016). In fragile and conflict-affected states, patronage politics 
are even more likely to disproportionally affect youth. Networks of ‘big men’ can tie youth into 
patronage, and sometimes mobilise them for political ends in exchange for economic 
opportunities (Enria, 2015; Lindell and Utas, 2012; Utas, 2012). In post-conflict settings, such 
networks have evolved out of relationships between commanders and their more junior ranks 
(Enria, 2015). In more authoritarian regimes, there are clear links between political parties, their 
youth wings, and the distribution of economic opportunities, including through national youth 
policies (Oosterom, 2016; 2018). This is the case in Zimbabwe, for instance (Maringira & 
Gukurume, 2018; Oosterom et al., 2016), and in Ethiopia (Balcha Gebremariam, 2017).  
To recap, social relationships, particularly family, play a key role in shaping young people’s 
access to jobs and the way they are able to navigate economic realities. Young people are not 
simply dependent on older adults’ social networks, but also establish networks with one another. 
Young people’s social positions and life transitions are dependent on their relationships with 
family and broader society (Langevang, 2008), but the links which they are able to independently 
establish through peer networks are also critical as they launch into employment. While ‘who you 
know’ is generally influential for all working-aged individuals, young people may not yet know the 
‘right’ contacts. Moreover, in more fragile and politicised contexts, where regime actors or other 
political actors have an interest in mobilising youth or ‘buying’ them in, informal politics and 
patronage networks are likely to particularly affect youth. Even if older adults are also affected, 
younger people are often more vulnerable to political instrumentalisation. 
Table 6: How youth-specific are patronage, politics and social networks as a barrier to 
employment?  
Issue: patronage, 
politics and 
social networks  
Are youth disadvantaged? Explanation 
Logic says Evidence says 
Family 
background 
affects job 
prospects 
(yes) (yes) 
‘Class’ (social background) matters at 
all ages, and does not vary by age; 
however, its effects may be greatest 
during initial steps into the job market, 
which have path-dependent effects. 
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Peer networks 
affect job 
prospects 
yes ? 
Young people are likely to know other 
young people, who are less likely to 
be able to assist with employment 
opportunities. (Evidence gap) 
Local politics 
create in-
/outgroups 
no 
no 
(FCAS: yes) 
Local patronage politics has a strong 
effect on work opportunities, but this 
cuts across age groups. (For fragile/ 
conflict-affected states (FCAS), where 
political actors target youth, they are 
likely to be more affected.) 
Source: authors. 
4. Summary of findings 
This report has taken a fresh look at the African youth employment challenge by asking how 
youth-specific it is, and how youth-specific its causes are. A brief review of data showed that 
young people are indeed disadvantaged in finding work in Africa, and more young people are 
entering African labour markets than new jobs are created.  
The main body of the report assessed the logic and evidence for the youth-specificity of five key 
factors. First, lacking qualification for work was found not to be youth-specific; however, 
educational choices are becoming more complex, and young people lack the experience which 
employers often demand. Second, neither legal and governance frameworks nor, third, poor 
infrastructure emerged as very youth-specific factors; they affect all workers fairly equally, 
although access to finance and ICT might have some youth-specific effects. Socio-cultural norms 
have clearly differential effects on younger people: much of the work that young Africans can do 
(including entrepreneurship) is not seen as ‘proper’ work, employers are sometimes biased 
against younger applicants, and younger women are harmed by gender biases. Finally, 
patronage, politics and social networks also differentially affect younger people, because their 
peer networks may be less effective; local politics tend to have youth-specific effects in fragile 
and conflict-affected states. 
These findings do not so much deliver a final verdict as offer reasonable conclusions drawn from 
the body of research dedicated to understanding young people in labour markets in Africa. Three 
main implications can be highlighted: 
 Firstly, some informal barriers – particularly socio-cultural norms, patronage, politics and 
network effects – appear to be more youth-specific than formal barriers to employment. 
While recognising the importance of social norms leads to few easily implementable 
policy recommendations, it does suggest that a far deeper understanding of context-
specific norms and expectations is needed for the development of effective policies; 
norms and values profoundly shape the choices that young people (can) make. Similarly, 
recognising the practical importance of social relationships – patronage, politics, and 
social networks – in facilitating or constraining employment may inform future 
interventions that could seek to go with (rather than against) this ‘grain’, by considering 
the inclusionary effects that networks can have while tackling the most exclusionary 
ones. 
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 Secondly, if informal barriers to employment are a more youth-specific constraint than 
formal barriers, then the case for policies that focus on the formal barriers is less 
convincing. For instance, ‘supply-side’ programmes that deliver more education and 
upskilling run counter to the fact that young Africans are already better-qualified than 
before, and risk further saturating job markets (cf. Mader, 2018b). Programmes that 
address regulation, governance, or infrastructure as potential demand-side constraints, 
meanwhile, focus on factors that have relatively less direct bearing on African young 
people’s chances. There is even a risk that policies aimed at business environment 
reform, labour market deregulation, or infrastructure – if they are justified in terms of 
youth employment – risk instrumentalising rather than helping young people. 
 Finally, important evidence gaps have emerged – specifically, the evidence on how 
business reform, legal reform and infrastructure policies affect young people in practice 
remains weak, and much finer-grained empirical research is needed to support specific 
policy initiatives. More broadly, a better understanding of the very different needs, 
expectations and potentials of different young people – rural school-leavers, urban 
graduates, growth-oriented entrepreneurs, women and men, from rich or poor 
backgrounds – will inform better-targeted solutions. This underscores and bolsters the 
(fortunately) growing consensus that the success of youth employment programming 
depends on a much deeper understanding of the choices young individuals make and the 
contexts within which they make them.  
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